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The 1980s have been characterized by record 
post-Depression bank failure rates, a record num- 
ber of banks on the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation's (FDIC's) problem bank list, and 
record losses to the FDIC in terms of total dollar 
losses and losses per dollar of failed bank assets. 
Moreover,  as the cost and complexity of examin- 
ing banks have risen it has become increasingly 
more difficult for the bank regulators to attract 
and retain quality bank examiners. On the other 
hand, advances in computer technology give 
bank regulators the ability to monitor the condi- 
tion of banks without conducting an on-site 
examination. Therefore, off-site monitoring of 
banks has become an important part of the regu- 
latory examination umbrella. 
Off-site monitoring tracks the condition of 
banks using the quarterly call report balance 
sheet and income statement data.'  Banking reg- 
ulators use these early-warning systems to com- 
plement on-site examination and as a way to 
allocate scarce examination resources. When off- 
site monitoring indicates a deterioration of a 
bank's financial health, an on-site exam can then 
be conducted. 
1  The formal name for the call reports is the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council's Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income. 
The early-warning systems have been devel- 
oped from an extensive number of studies relat- 
ing bank condition to bank balance sheet and 
income statement data. These studies, which use 
financial data to evaluate financial condition, can 
be classified into two types. The first type is 
failed bank studies2 These studies use financial 
data to predict bank failures. Early-warning sys- 
tems devised from this literature would use the 
characteristics of failed banks as the benchmark 
for identifying problem institutions. 
The second type of research in this area uses 
financial data to classify banks into problem and 
nonproblem categories.3 In other words, these 
studies attempt to predict a bank's examination 
rating using only publicly available data. Our 
study falls into this class. We use call-report data 
to predict deterioration in condition as measured 
by changes in CAMEL ratings.* Unlike previous 
2  see Meyer and Pifer [1970],  Hanweck [1977], Martin [1977], Pettway 
and Sinkey [1980], Bovenzi el al. [1983],  Rose  and Kolari [1985],  Wesl [1985], 
Lane et al. [1986], Sinkey et al. [1987], and Pantalone and  Platt [1987]. 
3  See  Stuhr and Van Wicklen [1974], Sinkey [1975, 1977,  19781, Sinkey 
and Walker [1975], Korobow et al. [1977], and Korobow and Stuhr [1983]. 
4  CAMEL is an acronym for the five risk categories rated by the bank 
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forming loans in the analysis as a measure of 
asset quality. In addition, we explore the use of 
factor analysis as a way to statistically mimic the 
procedure used by examiners to assign CAMEL 
ratings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section I reviews the examination process and 
the assignment of CAMEL  ratings as a measure of 
condition. Section I1 discusses the role of off-site 
monitoring in the examination process. Section 
111 describes the data and the basic statistical 
methods we use in the study. The results of the 
analysis are reported in section IV and our con- 
clusions appear in section V. 
I.  The Role of  Bank 
Supervision and 
Examination  in the 
Regulatory  Process 
Bank supervision and regulation in the United 
States is frequently justified by the role that bank- 
ing plays in the payments system. That is, the 
safety and soundness of the banking system is 
perceived to be inexorably intertwined with the 
stability of the economy. Futhermore, supervi- 
sion and regulation reduce the moral hazard 
problem inherent in federal deposit insurance 
(see Jensen and Meckling [1976],  Benston et al. 
[1986],  and Buser et al. [I9811  ). By  identifying 
problems early, regulators are able to force cor- 
rective action, or close the institution in a 
manner that minimizes losses to depositors and 
the deposit-insurance fund, and that minimizes 
the disruptive impact on the economy. 
On-site examinations serve four basic func- 
tions in the regulatory process. First, they allow 
bank regulators to determine whether or not the 
bank is in violation of any state or federal bank- 
ing laws and regulations. Second, a bank exam 
may be conducted to evaluate a bank's elec- 
tronic funds transfer and on-line trading systems. 
Third, although bank exams are not specifically 
conducted for the purpose of detecting ill- 
advised or illegal activites on the part of bank 
officers, insiders and employees, on-site exami- 
nations are an effective method for detecting 
fraud and malfeasance. In fact, physical inspec- 
tion of a bank's books is often the only way to 
detect irregularities in the operation of the bank 
that may indicate illegal or ill-advised actions by 
bank employees (see Benston et al. [I9861  ).5 
The fourth role of on-site examinations is to 
determine the financial condition of a bank. 
Although banks are required to submit quarterly 
financial statements, known as the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council's 
Reports of Condition and Income, to the bank 
regulators, the best way to determine the quality 
of a bank's assets and management is still an on- 
site examination and appraisal of its books and 
operations. 
When the focus of the exam is to determine 
the financial condition of a bank, the examiner 
will rate the bank on a scale from one to five 
(one being the highest) in five basic areas. 
These five ratings are referred to as CAMEL  rat- 
ings. The first component of the CAMEL  rating is 
capital adequacy. Bank capital serves as the last 
line of defense against losses to uninsured dep- 
ositors, general creditors, and the FDIC. The 
examiner assesses the level and quality of the 
bank's capital base and assigns the bank a rating 
based on that assessment. 
Asset quality is the second component of a 
bank's CAMEL  rating. Examiners wade through 
loan documentation and check the quality of col- 
lateral (if any) backing each loan. They make 
judgements as to the quality of each borrower 
and his ability to repay the loan. Furthermore, 
they look for excessive exposure of the bank to a 
single borrower or industry. The recent problems 
in the Texas banking industry are a stark remind- 
er of the benefits of portfolio diversification. 
The third component of a bank's CAMEL  rating 
is based on the quality of its management. This 
is the most subjective of the ratings given by the 
examiner and is often influenced by the quality 
of the bank's other ratings. The management rat- 
ing is based on the examiner's perception of the 
quality of the bank's officers and the efficiency of 
the management structure. 
Earnings is the fourth component of the 
CAMEL  rating. Earnings are rated on both recent 
performance and the historical stability of the 
earnings stream. Examiners will look at the 
composition of bank profits to determine 
whether they come from a solid operating base 
or are driven by one-time gains, such as those 
generated by the sale of assets. Examiners regard 
earnings as the first line of defense against loan 
defaults and other unforeseen events. 
The fifth component of a bank's CAMEL  rating 
is liquidity. Liquidity is a measure of a bank's 
5  Historically, fraud and malfeasance have been a leading cause of  bank 
failures and they still are an important cause of  bank failures today. In fact, 
illegal acts (including fraud, misconduct, and risky speculation) by bank offic- 
ers, employees, and insiders were cited as the primary cause of  failure for 
over 33 percent of  the 138 banks that were closed in 1986 (see Kathleen 
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is an important area of risk facing banks because 
a liquidity crisis may result in the failure of a sol- 
vent bank. Examiners look at the bank's funding 
sources as well as the liquidity of its assets in 
determining this rating. 
The five component ratings are then subjec- 
tively weighted by the examiner to arrive at an 
overall CAMEL  rating for the bank. This rating is 
then used to determine the degree of regulatory 
attention and resources that will be devoted to 
the bank. A composite rating of one is thought to 
indicate a strong bank that could weather 
adverse economic conditions. A composite rat- 
ing of two means that the bank could be 
severely weakened by adverse economic condi- 
tions. A three-rated bank is thought to be at risk 
in an unfavorable economic environment. Four- 
rated banks are considered to be banks that are 
in danger of failing unless corrective actions are 
taken. Finally, a five rating indicates that the bank 
is likely to fail in the near future. 
II.  Off-Site Monitoring 
and  Bank  Regulation 
Although on-site examination of  banks is the 
best tool for determining the financial condition 
of banks, staff and budget constraints do not 
allow state and federal banking regulators to 
examine the majority of banks more frequently 
than once every 12 to 24  months. The frequency 
at which a bank is to be examined is determined 
by its composite CAMEL  rating at the time of its 
last exam. Problem banks (CAMEL rating of three, 
four, or five) are examined more frequently than 
banks with composite CAMELS of one or two. 
Unfortunately, the condition of a bank may 
have deteriorated since the time of its last exam- 
ination and may merit more regulatory scrutiny 
than its last CAMEL  rating indicates. The 
response to this problem has been the devel- 
opment of off-site monitoring of bank condition 
or early-warning models using quarterly call 
report data. Therefore, the off-site monitoring 
allows more current information to be brought 
into the supervisory process. When the early- 
warning system indicates a bank's condition is 
deteriorating, an exam can be triggered. That is, 
rather than being a substitute for on-site exami- 
nation, off-site monitoring is a valuable tool for 
setting examination priorities. Moreover, because 
financial conditions tend to deteriorate over 
time, a reliable early-warning system would 
allow examiners to devote more time and 
resources to detecting fraud, malfeasance, and 
other irregularities in a bank's operations. 
Two types of screens have been proposed for 
use in off-site monitoring. The first type utilizes 
quarterly balance sheet and income statement 
data from the call reports. These early warning 
models construct ratios from the call reports to 
proxy for the different types of risk targeted in 
the examination process. For example, pub- 
lished studies of early-warning systems (see 
Korobow et al. [ 19771 and Sinkey [ 1977, 19781 ) 
have used capital-to-asset ratios to proxy capital 
adequacy. Other ratios such as net charge-offs to 
total loans, operating income to operating 
expenses, return on assets, and core deposits to 
total liabilities are some of the ratios that have 
been used in these studies to proxy the other 
four components of the CAMEL  rating. Statistical 
procedures like logit analysis and discriminant 
analysis are then used to classify banks into 
problem and nonproblem categories on the 
basis of the ratios selected.6 
Sinkey (1977) proposed a second type of 
early-warning system that uses stock-market data 
as a screen for deteriorating condition. These 
models assume stock markets are efficient and 
that the underlying stochastic process governing 
stock returns is stable. The market screen for 
declining condition is based on the analysis of 
residuals from market model regressions on 
individual bank stock returns. Tests are per- 
formed on these residuals to detect abnormal 
negative performance by a bank. Negative 
abnormal performance by a bank's stock indi- 
cates a deterioration in its condition. One draw- 
back of this screen is that reliable stock-market 
data are available only for the largest 100 to 200 
banks, making this screen infeasible for the bulk 
of this country's more than 14,000 banks.' 
Ill.  Data and  Methods 
Data  Set 
The sample of banks analyzed in this study con- 
sists of 58 institutions examined by the Supervi- 
sion and Regulation Department ofthe Federal Re- 
serve Bank of Cleveland. These banks are located 
in Ohio, western Pennsylvania, eastern Kentucky, 
and the panhandle region of West Virginia. 
The data set includes at least one actual com- 
posite CAMEL  rating for each sample bank 
6  Call-report data is also used by bank regulators to construct non- 
statistical early-warning models that mimic the examination process. 
7  A second problem with the stock-market data is that most bank stock 




Best available copyRatio Number  Definition 
1  Primary capital/average assets 
2  Payout ratio 
3  Asset growth rate 
4  Net loan and lease charge-offdaverage total 
loans and leases 
5  Current recoveries/prior  charge-offs 
6  Nonperforming loans and leases/primary capital 
7  Loans and leases, past-due and nonaccrual/ 
gross loans and leases 
8  Loan loss reserve/total loans and leases 
9  Return on average assets 
10  Adjusted return on average assets 
11  Pretax return on average assets 
12  Net interest margin 
13  Overhead expense/average earning assets 
14  Provision for loan losses/average earning assets 
15  Securities gains or losses/average earning assets 
16  One year GAP/equity capital 
17  One year GAP/total assets 
18  Average earning assets/interest 
bearing liabilities 
19  Loans plus securities/total sources of funds 
20  Volatile liabilities/total sources of funds 
21  Net funds dependency 
22  Brokered deposits/total  deposits 
SOURCE:  Authors. - 
assigned at an on-site examination between 
November 1983 and July 1986. Several of the 
banks in the sample were examined more than 
once over this time period and so a total of 70 
composite CAMEL scores were available for the 
58 sample banks. 
The remainder of the data set is comprised of 
two sets of financial ratios constructed from pub- 
licly available quarterly call-report data. The 
definition of each ratio used in the study appears 
in table 1. The financial variables were pre- 
selected by the Supervision and Regulation 
Department of the Cleveland Federal Reserve 
Bank for use in a nonstatistical early-warning 
model developed to forecast CAMEL  ratings for 
the same set of sample banks. Thus, each ratio is 
included because it provides insight on a 
dimension of the financial condition of the sam- 
ple banks that is reflected in the actual compo- 
site CAMEL  rating. The ratios generally are sim- 
ilar to those used in previous early-warning 
failure-prediction models. 
One set of ratios (denoted by the prefix CURR, 
for current quarter) consists of the ratio values cal- 
culated using data from the quarterly call report 
immediately preceding the date at which the 
actual composite CAMEL  was assigned. If this call 
date was less than two months before the exam 
date, the current-quarter ratios were calculated 
using data from the next closest prior quarter. 
This was done to reflect the typical two-month 
lag in the availability of quarterly call data. 
The other set of ratios are labeled "previous 
quarter" (PREV).  These are the same set of ratios 
calculated using call data drawn from reports 
dated four months before the quarter designated 
as current. 
The  Statistical Models 
The logit-regression technique was employed to 
construct several different versions of a model 
that could be used to predict changes in the 
CAMEL  ratings or, alternatively, the financial 
condition of the sample banks. Logit analysis was 
used instead of ordinary least squares or discrim- 
inant analysis because the classification accuracy 
of models estimated using this technique has 
typically been found to be as good or better than 
that obtained using other methods.8 
In all versions of the estimated equations, the 
dependent variable takes on a value of 1 for 
sample banks that are categorized as "high risk." 
These, in turn, are defined to be sample banks 
with composite CAMEL  ratings of 3, 4 or 5. The 
dependent variable takes on a value of zero for 
"low risk banks, in other words, those with 
CAMEL  ratings of 1 or 2.9 
Two different types of models were then esti- 
mated for each set of financial data (that is, "cur- 
rent quarter" and "previous quarter"). In one 
model, the dependent variable was related to 
subsets of the ratios appearing in table 1. In the 
other model, a two-step procedure was 
W  8  For a discussion of  logit regression and its relative merits see Bovenzi, 
el al. (1983), Martin (1977) and Amemiya (1981). 
9  The decision to place three-rated banks in the high-risk category is 
somewhat arbitrary. However, while a CAMEL ratlng of 3 does not indicate 
that examiners believe the bank is close to failure, it does reflect  their judg- 
ment that it is more vulnerable than 1- or  2-rated institutions and that there is 
need for some corrective action and closer regulatory supervision. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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Best available copyor factors indicative of greater risk or financial 
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Chi-Square  weakness (that is, lower capital, lower asset qual- 
Constant  -3.48450  -4.61  32.03  ity, lower earnings, or less liquidity) are 
CURRO6  0.108156  3.40  expected to be positive. 
Probabilitv Cutoff Value 
---  -- 
0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2 
Classification accuracy (%)  87.1  88.6  87.1  81.4 
Type I error rate (%)  43.8  37.5  31.3  25.0 
Type I1 error rate (%)  3.7  3.7  7.4  16.7 
SOURCE: Authors. 
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Chi-Square 
Constant  -4.75058  -1.58  35.51 
CURRO6  0.093926  2.69 
CURROl  0.101593  0.48 
CURR13  0.355459  0.64 
CURR09  -0.606462  -0.77 
Probability Cutoff Value 
Classification accuracy (%)  90.0  90.0  88.6  85.7 
Type I error rate (%)  31.3  31.3  25.0  25.0 
Type I1 error rate (%)  3.7  3.7  7.4  11.1 
SOURCE: Authors. 
employed. First, factor analysis was used to con- 
vert the considerable number of correlated 
financial ratios into a much smaller number of 
composite variables or factors that are linear 
combinations of the original data.I0 The 
intended result is the creation of a small set of 
explanatory variables that contains basically the 
same information as the larger data set. This sta- 
tistical procedure mimics the procedure used by 
bank examiners to construct the composite 
CAMELS assigned at exams. The set of generated 
factors were then used to construct factor scores 
for each sample bank. Logit regressions were 
10  The  factor-analysis method used is principal-awis factor analysis with 
prior communality estimates set equal to the squared multiple correlations 
among variables. The  rotation method used was varlmaw. 
IV.  Empirical Results 
Each type of logit model was estimated using 
three different samples. One, dubbed the "large 
sample," contained all 70 available observations 
for the 58 sample banks. Another, labeled the 
"small sample," contained only one observation 
for each of the 58 sample banks. These two 
samples were used to examine the in-sample 
classification accuracy of the estimated logit 
models. Since the results using the large and 
small samples are essentially the same, only the 
large sample results are reported. The third sam- 
ple, called the "random sample" is a random 
sample of 40 banks drawn from the small sam- 
ple, yielding a hold-out sample of 18 banks. The 
logit models were then estimated using the 
sample of 40 banks and used to classify the hold- 
out sample. 
Logit Analysis  With  Ratio 
Independent Variables 
Estimated logit equations in which subsets of the 
nontransformed financial ratios were used as 
independent variables appear in tables 2 to 5. 
The equations reported are those that did the 
best job of in-sample classification, using a 50 
percent probability cutoff to assign banks to the 
high-risk group.I2 In-sample classification results 
are also presented for alternative lower probabil- 
ity cutoff values. 
The results demonstrate that the key predic- 
tive financial ratio is a measure of asset quality, 
defined as nonperforming loans and leases 
E  I1 This is the same approach used in West (1985) 
12  The  probability cutoff value is the critical value used to assign the 
sample banks to a risk group, given the prediction of  an estimated model.  A 
predicted probability value above the cutoff implies that the bank should be 
placed in the high-risk group. A cutoff value of 0.5 assumes that the prior proba- 
bilities of group membership and the misclassification costs of  Type I and 
Type  II errors are equal. Lower cutoff values reflect the view that these 
assumptions are incorrect. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1988 Q 2
Best available copyVariable  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Chi-Square 
Constant  -3.08714  -4.72  27.88 
PREVO6  0.084124  3.29 
Probability Cutoff Value 
Classification accuracy (%)  87.1  88.6  87.1  80.0 
Type I error rate (%)  43.8  37.5  37.5  31.3 
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Probabilitv Cutoff Value 
Classification  accuracy (%)  91.4  88.6  85.7  84.3 
Type I error rate (%)  31.3  31.3  25.0  18.8 
Type I1 error rate (%)  1.9  5.6  11.1  14.8 
SOURCE: Authors. 
racy ranges kom roughly 82 to 90 percent. For 
comparative purposes, the classification accuracy 
of a naive model (which predicts that a bank's 
current CAMEL is the same as the one assigned 
at its last exam) is 87.1  percent and 84.5  percent 
for the large and small samples, respectively. 
While the overall classification accuracy of the 
estimated models is important, judging their use- 
fulness as early-warning tools requires an exami- 
nation of the Type I (classifying a high-risk bank 
as a low-risk one) and Type I1  (classifying a low- 
risk bank as a high-risk one) error rates of each. 
Type I errors are typically considered more 
serious, but if a statistical early-warning model is 
being developed to aid in the allocation of 
scarce examination resources, the Type I1  error 
rate is also of concern. 
Not unexpectedly, the Type I and Type I1 error 
rates of the estimated models vary across models 
and vary with the probability cutoff values used 
for each one. In general, the Type I error rates 
are considerable for the estimated models when 
a 0.5 probability cutoff is employed, while the 
Type I1 error rates are very low. The Type I error 
rates are generally in excess of 30 percent. 
Reducing the probability cutoff values generally 
decreases the Type I error rate at the cost of 
some increase in the Type I1 rate. When a 0.2 
probability cutoff is used (approximately equal 
to the sample proportion of high-risk banks), the 
Type I error rate is reduced to roughly 20 per- 
cent. The trade-off is a rise in the Type I1  rate to 
the 15 percent level. Again, for comparative pur- 
poses, the naive model has a Type I error rate of 
37.5 percent for the large sample and 46.2  per- 
cent for the small one. The Type I1 error rates 
are 5.6 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively. 
Interestingly, a comparison of the results ob- 
tained using current-quarter and previous-quarter 
ratios indicates only minor differences in the 
classification accuracy of the estimated models. 
divided by primary capital (ratio 6).  The esti- 
mated coefficient on this variable is positive as 
expected and is statistically significant in almost 
every case. The results obtained when additional 
ratios are included are less impressive. The esti- 
Logit Analysis With 
Factor  Scores as 
Explanatory  Variables 
mated coefficients on the variables are rarely  Preliminary investigation indicated that most of  significant and sometimes even exhibit the  the variation in the data set could be accounted  "wrong sign." Further, adding these variables has  for by a relatively small number of factors.  only a marginal impact on classification accuracy.I3 
Accordingly, factor analysis was used on various  Depending on the sample, model, and chosen 
subsets of the financial ratios to extract two,  probability cutoff value, overall classification accu-  three or four factors from the sample data. Logit 
regressions were then estimated using the sets of 
two-, three-,  or four-factor scores produced and 
w  13  This result is similar to Sinkey [1977]. He finds that the ratio of prim-  used to classify the sample banks into the two 
ary capital net of classified assets to total assets (net capital ralio) is Ihe best  risk  This exercise r€vealed that the pre- 
discriminator between problem and nonproblem banks.  dictive accuracy of the three-and four-factor 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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variety. Thus, only the two-factor results are 
reported and discussed. 
The rotated factor-loading matrices for the 
two-factor models used in the logit regressions 
reported immediately below appear in tables 6 
and 7.  These matrices provide insight on the 
relationship between the observed variables or 
ratios and the factors produced by the factor 
analysis. The factor loadings, in turn, are used to 
generate the coefficients that allow the ratios to 
be converted into factor scores that are ulti- 
mately used as explanatory variables in the logit 
regressions estimated. Relatively heavy loadings 
(that is, loadings close to one in absolute value) 
indicate a close relationship between that variable 
and the constructed factor and imply that the 
value of that ratio will have a relatively large 










Logit Model 5 
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Chi-Square 
Constant  -1.37361  -3.14  37.53 
FACTOR1  4.24095  3.31 
FACTOR2  0.86227  0.86 
Probability Cutoff Value 
0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2 
Classification accuracy (%)  90.0  90.0  85.7  82.9 
Type I error rate (%)  31.3  31.3  31.3  25.0 
Type I1 error rate (%)  3.7  3.7  9.3  14.8 
SOURCE: Authors. 
of the loading indicates the relationship between 
that particular ratio and the factor score. 
In general, an examination of the factor- 
loading matrices reveals that several asset-quality 
measures typically cluster together on the first 
factor. Two other earnings-efficiency-type ratios- 
return on assets and the overhead expense 
ratio-also tend to load on factor one, along 
with the asset-quality ratios. The signs of the 
loadings on the ratios imply that a sample bank's 
score on this factor will be higher, the lower its 
asset quality, the lower its profitability,  and the 
higher its overhead expenses. Thus, higher scores 
on this factor are indicative of greater risk. 
Two liquidity-type ratios-loans plus securi- 
ties/total sources of funds and volatile liabilities/ 
total sources of funds-typically load together on 
the second factor. The signs of the loadings 
imply that scores on this factor will be higher, 
the higher the former ratio and the lower the lat- 
ter one. The sign of the loading on the volatile 
liability ratio suggests that higher levels of this 
ratio are indicative of more sophisticated liability 
management and this, in turn, suggests greater 
liquidity. Higher scores on this factor imply 
greater liquidity risk. 
A third ratio, primary capital/average assets, 
also tends to load together with the two liquidity 
ratios. The sign of the loading is positive, imply- 
ing higher factor scores for banks with higher 
capital ratios. The reason for the positive loading 
is unclear. 
The estimated logit regressions reported in 
each table are very similar. In each, the coeffi- 
cients on the factors exhibit the expected posi- 
tive signs, but only the coefficient on the asset- 
quality-earnings factor is statistically significant. 
The in-sample classification accuracy of this 
type of model does not differ markedly from 
models using simple ratio values. This is true 
regardless of the sample or type of data 
employed to construct the factor scores. 
When the probability cutoff value is set at 0.5, 
roughly 90 percent of the sample banks are cor- 
rectly classified. The Type I error rates of the fac- 
tor score logits are roughly 30 percent. Type I1 er- 
ror rates are generally less than 5 percent. Again, 
lowering the probability cutoff value lowers the 
Type I error rate at the cost of an increase in the 
Type I1 rate. The Type I error rate remains consid- 
erable, hovering around 25 percent even when 
the probability cutoff value is reduced to 0.2. 
As was true for the models in which simple 
ratios were used, the predictive accuracy of the 
factor-score models estimated with previous- 
quarter data is generally no worse and some- 
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Logit Model 6 
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Chi-Square 
Constant  -1.26098  -3.05  35.10 
FACTOR1  4.55155  3.27 
FACTOR2  0.86765  0.93 
Probability Cutoff Value 
0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2 
Classification accuracy (%)  90.0  87.1  85.7  84.3 
Type I error rate (%)  31.3  31.3  31.3  18.8 
Tv~e  I1 error rate (%)  3.7  7.4  9.3  14.8 
SOURCE: Authors. - 
Out-of-Sample 
Model Forecasts 
Each  type of model was reestimated using a ran- 
domly selected sample of 40 sample banks and 
was used to classify a holdout sample of 18 
banks. In general, the results mirror the findings 
already discussed above. 
In particular, the most useful current-quarter 
ratio continues to be the nonperforming-loan 
ratio. The out-of-sample classification of the 
estimated equation in which this ratio is the only 
explanatory variable is relatively accurate, given 
the small size of the sample being examined. 
Generally, over 80 percent of the holdout sam- 
ple is correctly classified.  When probability cutoff 
values of 0.4 and 0.5 are used, the Type I1 error 
rate is very low, while the Type I rate is consid- 
erable. For lower probability cutoff values, the 
Type I error rate falls to roughly 20 percent 
without a marked increase in the Type I1  rate. 
When additional ratios are used in the estimated 
equations, the forecasting performance of the 
estimated models improves slightly. 
The predictive accuracy of the estimated logit 
models is roughly the same when current-quarter 
factor scores are used as explanatory variables. 
This was found to be true regardless of the num- 
ber of factors employed. The results obtained 
using previous-quarter data generally mirrored 
those obtained using current-quarter data. 
V.  Summary and 
Conclusion 
The results of this study are in accord with those 
reported by many others who have done pre- 
vious empirical work on early-warning failure- 
prediction models. Specifically, the results dem- 
onstrate that relatively simple models 
constructed using only a limited number of 
financial ratios that are derived solely from pub- 
licly available information do a reasonably good 
job of classifying commercial banks into different 
risk classes. The overall classification accuracy 
and Type I and Type I1 error rates of the models 
estimated in this study are comparable to those 
reported by other researchers.14 
In addition, the critical predictive role of asset 
quality and earnings measures detected in pre- 
vious empirical work is confirmed.15 Particularly 
noteworthy is the performance of the asset- 
quality proxy, nonperforming loans divided by 
primary capital. Models employing only this vari- 
able perform as well as more complicated mod- 
els. Furthermore, nonperforming loans appear to 
be as good a proxy for asset quality as classified 
assets derived from examination reports (not 
publicly available). Previous studies were unable 
to employ asset-quality proxies using nonper- 
forming loans because it was not available on 
the call reports before March 1983. 
The results actually are somewhat better than 
expected given a number of circumstances. First, 
the sample size is very small, much smaller in 
fact than that used in many previous studies. 
14  For  example, Wang, et a1.(1987)  examined a sample of over 2,900 
S&L's in a similar study. They report in-sample classification accuracy of 74 
percent and Type I and Type  II error rates of 31 and 21 percent using a proba- 
bility cutoff value of 0.5. 
a 15  Asset quality and earnings measures have been found lo be signifi- 
cant predictors of bank risk andlor failure in virtually every study reviewed. 
See, for example, Hirschhorn (1986), 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1988 Q 2
Best available copySecond, the set of potential explanatory variables 
was limited at the outset. Given the results 
obtained in previous work, it is possible that the 
use of several other variables and/or slightly dif- 
ferent versions of ratios actually employed (all of 
which would be constructed from publicly avail- 
able data) would have improved the predictive 
power of the estimated models. 
In particular, a size measure might have 
proven useful, given that the dependent variable 
is constructed from examiner perceptions of 
bank risk. It is known that examiners incorporate 
bank size into their evaluations of the financial 
condition of banks and a size variable has been 
found to be useful in previous empirical stud- 
ies.16 Loan composition measures such as the 
ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total 
loans or assets have been found to be significant 
predictors of bank risk in other work and may 
have improved the classification accuracy of the 
models estimated in this study." 
Some researchers have reported that slightly 
different versions of the ratios available for use 
in this study improved the predictive power of 
their models. For example, the ratios of other 
operating expenses to total assets and primary 
capital divided by risk assets have been found to 
be superior to the expense and capital measures 
used in this study.'* 
Finally, the risk profile of the particular sample 
of banks used in this study made them difficult 
to accurately classify with a statistical model. A 
large proportion (roughly two-thirds) of the sam- 
ple banks had CAMEL  ratings of 2 or 3. Very few 
of the sample banks had CAMEL  ratings of 4 or 5. 
Thus, the ratio values of the high-risk and low- 
risk banks in the sample were not markedly dif- 
ferent. This may be one reason why the perfor- 
mance of the estimated models was not better 
and why the results can be characterized as rela- 
tively good.'" 
W  16  A size variable is used in Barth, et  al. (1985), Sinkey, et al. (1987), 
and West  (1985), for example. See  also the discussion in Bovenzi, et al. 
(1983), Korobow and Stuhr (1983) and Hirschhom (1986) about the usefulness 
of size data. 
W  17  The ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans was found 
to be significantly related to bank financial condition in Pantalone and Platt 
(1987) and Martin (1977), for example. 
W  18  The relative merits of alternative expense measures are discussed in 
Bovenzi, et al. (1983). The capital-to-risk asset ratio is used in Martin (1977). 
W  19  It should also be noted that the dependent variable is a subjective 
measure and reflects examiners' perceptions of bank risk. Further, one compo- 
nent of  the CAMEL rating that is incompletely reflected in published financial 
statements is management quality. Thus, an incorrect classification does not 
necessarily mean that the model is in enor. 
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